Many of those who are interested in the UFO issue in general, and the ufo-lore in particular, are familiar with this documentary from 2013: http://www.miragemen.com/
Even if you have already watched the documentary, I think it is an idea to watch it again, and ponder its content. Especially, if it has been a while since you watched it. And even though you have decided about the "Dr Eric W. Davis notes" on his meeting with Admiral Wilson, the notes of the same Dr Davis about his conversations with Christopher "Kit" Green, and the "Majestic 12 documents".
I recently watched Mirage Men for a second time. This second time around, and because of these recent "leaks", I found the information in Mirage Men more relevant than the first time I watched it. To watch and listen to all those past disinformation campaigns from Air Force intelligence (represented by Richard Doty), CIA, NSA, etc., helped me to be more levelheaded, and think with greater detachment about these recent "leaks" that have hit the UFO community.
What I remember most from Mirage Men, is that even the former disinformation-agents featured in the documentary say that all effective disinformation has some important facts and truths in it. One of the former Air Force intelligence agents (Walter Bosley), even says that some facts or truths in a disinformation campaign have to be the most extreme ones.
Disinformation about the UFO phenomenon is old news. Everyone seriously interested in the UFO subject is well aware of that. That disinformation is a mix of facts, half-lies, and information impossible to either
So, why are some people ready to believe every single "leaked" ufo document as fast as it comes out in the public domain, with no kind of scrutiny? Why are some people ready to dismiss every single "leaked" ufo document as a hoax as fast as it comes out in the public domain, with no kind of scrutiny?
If what the former AFOSI personnel are saying about effective disinformation is true, then we have an incentive to examine and assess the latest UFO leaks.
The challenge is to differentiate truth/facts from disinformation/noise. That effort will take time. Therefore, I raise my hat to anyone who will take on this challenge impartially.
Remember what the AFOSI agents in Mirage Men are saying about an effective disinformation campaign.
The next challenge is: Can we trust them?
Addendum 2026-06-08:
[J. T]: I have a question about principles or techniques in Psychological Operations (Psy-Ops). First, I would like you to confirm that the Psy-Ops principles I mention are real. For example, do the CIA use the mentioned principles? Second, I would like you to summarize what the following principles mean, what their main purpose is, and when the respective principle is likely used.
The principles are: Magruder's principle, Jones's dilemma, Cry wolf, and Monkey's paw.
[AI-model]: Good
question — let me search before answering, since I want to be precise about
which of these are formally documented principles and which may be more
informal or folk terminology in the field.
I now have
everything I need for a thorough and well-sourced answer. Here it is:
Are
these real, documented principles?
Yes — all
four are real. They are not primarily CIA principles but rather formal
U.S. military deception (MILDEC) doctrine, codified in the U.S.
Army Field Manual FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception (1988). FM
90-2 lists ten deception maxims derived by the intelligence community from game
theory, historical evidence, social science, and decision analysis theory.
Magruder's Principle, Jones' Dilemma, Cry-Wolf, and the Monkey's Paw all appear
on that list. While the CIA and other intelligence agencies operate within
overlapping conceptual territory, these four principles are specifically
Army/MILDEC doctrine, not CIA doctrine per se — though they are widely
referenced across the U.S. intelligence community. BITS
1.
Magruder's Principle
Magruder's
Principle states that it is generally easier to induce a target to maintain a
pre-existing belief than to deceive them into changing that belief. It is
named after General John B. Magruder of the Confederate Army. Global
SecurityWavell Room
Purpose: Rather than trying to plant
entirely new beliefs — which is cognitively difficult and risks detection — the
deceiver exploits what the target already thinks is true. It is a form of
cognitive jujitsu: let the enemy's own assumptions do the work.
When
used: Operation
Desert Storm is a classic example. Intelligence indicated that Saddam Hussein
expected a coalition attack from the Persian Gulf and a drive north from Saudi
territory. Deception planners reinforced this preexisting belief with decoys
while disguising the actual westward flanking maneuver — the "left
hook" — that caused Iraqi forces to collapse within four days of ground
combat. Similarly, the D-Day deceptions exploited Hitler's preconception
that the most likely invasion site was Pas-de-Calais, the shortest channel
crossing — a belief the Allies fed and reinforced rather than tried to
replace. Modern War Institute -Imperial War Museums
2.
Jones's Dilemma
Jones's
Dilemma holds that deception generally becomes more difficult as the number of
sources available to the target to confirm the "real" increases.
However — and this is the flip side — the greater the number of sources that
can be deceptively manipulated, the greater the chance of providing the target
with convincing, all-source confirmation of the false picture. Global
Security
Purpose: It frames the core structural
challenge of deception: a sophisticated enemy with multiple intelligence
channels (signals, human sources, satellite imagery, etc.) is harder to fool —
unless you can corrupt or control all those channels
simultaneously.
When
used: Most
relevant in high-stakes strategic deception against a well-resourced adversary.
The Allied WWII Double-Cross System — turning German agents and feeding false
information back through them — was in part a response to this dilemma: by
controlling the enemy's human intelligence network, the Allies could
manufacture consistent "all-source" confirmation of false scenarios.
Jones's Dilemma, alongside Magruder's Principle, is considered one of the most
important principles in current U.S. military deception doctrine. U.S. Naval Institute
3.
Cry-Wolf
Cry-Wolf is
rooted in a known limitation of human information processing: targets
frequently fail to detect small, gradual changes in indicators, even when the
cumulative change over time is large. This is used as a conditioning-based
deceptive technique. Global
Security
Purpose: By repeatedly signaling
something — a threat, a movement, a pattern — that turns out to be
insignificant or false, the deceiver conditions the target to stop reacting to
that signal. When the real operation finally occurs using the same indicators,
the target dismisses it as another false alarm.
When
used: Particularly
effective in operations where there is time to build behavioral patterns over
weeks or months. It can be used to mask troop buildups, impending strikes, or
any operation that leaves a detectable signature — as long as the deceiver can pre-condition
the target to discount that signature. The logic is identical to Aesop's fable:
the wolf really does come eventually, but the village has been trained not to
respond.
4. The
Monkey's Paw
The name
comes from the W.W. Jacobs horror story in which wishes are granted, but with
catastrophically unintended consequences. In deception doctrine, it refers to
the risk that a successful deception produces unwanted or unforeseen reactions
from the target — or friendly fratricide from one's own forces.
One
documented example involves Operation BREST in WWII, where the 23rd
Headquarters Special Troops (a top-secret 1,100-man deception unit) portrayed
an armor attack buildup that the Germans apparently believed. Due to poor
coordination, an actual U.S. armored unit then tried to attack in that area. In
another similar operation, the German commander who was successfully deceived
into believing he faced overwhelming U.S. armor decided to launch a spoiling
attack — the opposite of the intended outcome. Global
Security
Purpose: The Monkey's Paw is less a
technique than a warning principle — a built-in caution. It
reminds deception planners that the target is a rational actor who will respond to
the false picture, not simply freeze. The target's response may be logical
given their misperception, but still undesirable from the deceiver's
perspective.
When
used: The
principle applies to every deception operation as a planning constraint.
Doctrine explicitly states that the deception objective should be framed in
terms of what you want the target to do, not merely what you want
them to think — because thinking and doing are not the same
thing, and the gap between them is where the Monkey's Paw lives. Global Security
A note
on CIA vs. military attribution: These maxims originate in Army MILDEC doctrine and the broader
U.S. intelligence community's theoretical work on deception. The CIA certainly
operates within this conceptual tradition, but if you're citing these to
someone, the precise institutional home is Army Field Manual FM 90-2 and
related doctrine — not CIA publications specifically.
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